The article sets out to reinterpret HeraclitusÕ views on religion and, by implication, his position in the context of the Presocratic philosophersÕ relationship to the Greek cultural tradition. It does so by examining the fragments in which HeraclitusÕ attitude to the popular religion of his time is re ected. The analysis of the fragments 69, 68, 15, 14, 5, 96, 93 and 92 DK reveals that the target of HeraclitusÕ criticism is not the religious practices themselves, but their popular interpretation. HeraclitusÕ fragments are simultaneously shown to identify the underlying structure of the Ôunity of opposites,Õ inherent in various religious practices. Heraclitus appears to reinterpret religious practices in terms of the conceptual structures of his own philosophy. On the other hand, religion provides him with the categories for the construction of his philosophical theology. Thus HeraclitusÕ treatment of religion is shown to be analogous to his treatment of ethics and politics, which he also tries to incorporate into his highly integrated vision of reality. In contrast to XenophanesÕ radical critique of the traditional religion, Heraclitus emerges not as a reformer or an AufklŠrer, but as an interpreter, who tries to discern the structures of meaning inherent in the existing practices, and to assume them into his own philosophical project.
from insight into the essence of being.Õ 2 That is in spite of the explicit antagonism, on HeraclitusÕ part, to XenophanesÕ intellectual enterprise (cf. fr. 40).
If we turn to Heraclitean scholarship, the dominating picture appears to be even more unequivocal. Heraclitus is credited with illuministico radicalismo in matters of religion by Marcovich, 3 whereas according to Kahn, ÔHe is a radical, an uncompromising rationalist, whose negative critique of the tradition is more extreme than that of Plato a century later. [ Why should the way Heraclitus related to the practices and beliefs current in the popular religion of his time be so important? At stake is, I propose, the relationship between philosophy in statu nascendi and one of the more important aspects of the Greek cultural tradition. Were all the early philosophic attempts characterised by emancipation from traditional piety, as the conventional opinion of scholars would have us believe? Or was there a more complex pattern in the relationship to traditional religion, represented by one of the most prominent proponents of the enterprise that had yet to de ne itself as ÔphilosophyÕ ? In what follows, I shall provide an alternative interpretation of the fragments dealing with the rituals and cults of traditional Greek religion.
Most of the extant fragments of Heraclitus dealing with the forms of traditional Greek piety were quoted during the religious controversies concerning pagan religion, from the 3rd century AD onwards. Curiously enough, the fragments of Heraclitus were employed by both the opponents and the apologists of paganism. The authors who sought HeraclitusÕ support in that debate were Christian writers -Clement, Arnobius, Origenes, Gregory of Nazianzus, the author of Theosophia Tubingensis, Elias of Crete -as well as pagans: Iamblichus, Celsus, Apollonius of Tyana.
Looking at the fragments themselves one cannot avoid realising how exhaustive they are in representing popular Greek religious practices, the list whereof reads not unlike an attempt at systematic classi cation: sacri ces (fr. 69), mystery cults and initiation rites (fr. 14), worship of ef gies of gods and heroes (fr. 5) and prayers to them (ibid.), phallic processions and, probably, certain other ritual obscenities (frr. 15, 68), sacred chants (fr. 15), religious festivals -viz., Lenaia (fr. 15), puri cation rites (fr. 5), oracles -both temple-centred, like the Delphic one (fr. 93), and practised by the itinerant priestesses (fr. 92). Besides, as I shall argue below, fr. 96 may have contained references to funerary rites. We are already a long way from XenophanesÕ theology, for the concentration upon the Ôsuper cial,Õ performative aspect of religious practices does not come into theoretical focus in XenophanesÕ critique of the traditional religion. XenophanesÕ critical re ection is riveted by the contradictions in the doctrine, and, correspondingly, in the nature of gods that it postulates, and by the issuing theory of anthropomorphic representation. Heraclitus has almost next to nothing to say concerning the nature of gods as it is represented by the traditional religion, but concentrates a good deal upon the religious practices -with thoroughness that is reminiscent of an early attempt at Ôsys-tematisation.Õ I am not unconscious of the danger of over-interpreting what may be merely a random collection of references as an attempt at systematic classi cation. It seems, however, that the use of the word Ôsys-tematicÕ in this case is justi ed insofar as the religious phenomena that appear in HeraclitusÕ fragments (a) are of the same order -they almost exclusively refer to the performative rather than the doctrinal aspect of religious practices (particular gods are mentioned either in connection to some of the aforementioned practices, as Hades and Dionysus in fr. 15, Apollo in fr. 93, or in the context of relating HeraclitusÕ own philosophical theology to the deities of the traditional religion, as Zeus in fr. 32); (b) refer to an extensive and non-overlapping range of practices. This presupposes a considerable degree of theoretical articulatedness and classi cation, and although the articulation itself may not be complete (in the sense that as a descriptive catalogue the list of the religious practices is not exhaustive), it is still justi able to call it ÔsystematicÕ in virtue of the categorising procedure that made it possible.
Was it due to the effort at a systematic refutation of conventional religion? This, however, seems unlikely, insofar as at least some of the fragments are obviously endorsing the religious phenomena they refer to (most notably, fr. 93, also fr. 92 and, by implication, fr. 15). Was it, then, perhaps HeraclitusÕ intention to comprehend religion systematically in order to examine its structures of meaning in the light of the categories that his own philosophy generated -and, maybe, to give thereby another justication to his own philosophising? The answer may be found by the careful reading of the fragments themselves.
Before we embark upon the reinterpretation of the relevant fragments, let us linger awhile on a fragment that does not yield very far to interpretation. Fr. 69 consists of IamblichusÕ en passant mention of Heraclitus as he discusses forms of sacri ces: kaÜ yusiÇn toÛnun tÛyhmi dittOE eàdh: tOE m¢n gOEr pokekayarm¡nvn pant‹pasin nyrÅpvn, oåa ¤fƒ ¥nòw n pote g¡noito spanÛvw, Ëw fhsin "Hr‹kleitow, tinvn ôlÛgvn eéariym®tvn ndrÇn, tOE dƒ ¦nula kaÜ svmatoeid° ktl. There is no reason to doubt the connection, made by Iamblichus, of the original Heraclitean saying with sacri ces, 7 and, in all probability, the words oåa ¤fƒ ¥nòw n pote g¡noito spanÛvw more or less closely paraphrase a segment of the original fragment which thus must have contained the opposition of Ôone vs. manyÕ, with the paramount axiological emphasis on the Ôone.Õ It is dif cult to fail to notice the parallels that this fragment has with the so-called ÔpoliticalÕ fragments and with HeraclitusÕ vision of society in general. Heraclitus perceives society as an interaction between ÔoneÕ or ÔfewÕ worthy individuals on the one hand, and of the ignorant worthless multitude on the other. The polarity of Ôone vs. many,Õ that is fundamental to HeraclitusÕ doctrine of Ôunity of opposites,Õ thereby reasserts itself in the sphere of the political organisation of the society. In fact, as Kahn .) ). Therefore it is reassuring to nd the same polarity reappearing in the context of the discussion of religious practices.
I shall concentrate rst of all on the group of fragments that can be linked together as belonging to the context of mysteries and Dionysiac rituals. Fr. 14 (ÔThe mysteries current among men initiate them into impiety,Õ as Kahn eloquently translates it) has been considered downright antireligious, fr. 15 (v. infra) as showing an ambiguous, but probably negative attitude to the Dionysiac celebrations. One word, quoted by Iamblichus and surviving as fr. 68 DK, however, will serve as a clue to the reinterpretation of the whole group of fragments.
In Ch. 11 of the Book I of the Mysteries of the Egyptians, Iamblichus attempts to explain, in a rationalising way, the obscene rites -viz., the erection of phalli (tÇn fallÇn st‹siw (38, 14-15)) and the obscene language (aÞsxrorhmosaenai (39, 3-4)) -practised in the context of mystery religion. Having offered an allegorical explanation of the phalli as a symbol of generative powers of the cosmos (38, 15-39, 3), and having interpreted the obscenities as an ÔindicationÕ (¦ndeigma) of the fact that matter is deprived of beauty, and of the formlessness of the to-be-formed (39, 4-13), Iamblichus continues: ÔAnd yet these practices have another reason that followsÕ (39, 14). There follows an account of the cathartic function of obscene rituals, ultimately descending from AristotleÕs account of katharsis in the Poetics (cf. 6, 1449b27-28) and the Politics (VIII, 1341b38-1342a15): just as the attempt to constrain passions intensi es them, so, to an equal degree, short and limited indulgence appeases, puri es the passions and reduces their strength. Just as the contemplation of the Ôpassions of the othersÕ in tragedy and comedy helps to stabilise, make more orderly and purify oneÕs own passions, likewise Ôin certain sacred visions and hearings of obscene things, we are liberated from the harm that follows those things if they are practisedÕ (39, 8) .
It is in this context that the reference to Heraclitus occurs: ÔAnd therefore Heraclitus ttingly called them ÒremediesÓ ( kea), since they remedy the dangers and render souls healthy from the calamities of becoming (tÇn ¤n t» gen¡sei sumforÇn)Õ (40, 12-15).
There is no reason to distrust what Iamblichus implies -that Heraclitus applied the word kea to the obscene rituals (fr. 15 testi es HeraclitusÕ interest both in phallic processions and in hymns dedicated to the aÞdoÝa). It would be dif cult, however, to disentangle any speci cally Heraclitean sense from this meagre reference, if we did not possess fr. 58, speaking of medical activities: ÔDoctors who cut and burn complain that they do not receive the reward they deserve.Õ 8 The paradox that Heraclitus uncovers in medical activities is an instance of the governing structure of the Ôunity of oppositesÕ: medical activity appears as the paradoxical unity of both the disease and health; by in icting pain (a characteristic of disease) it heals (i.e., removes pain). Similarly pain may be treated as a single phenomenon that extends over two contrary states: disease and health. Despite being a characteristic of disease, it is also productive of health (in the activity of doctors). Thus medical activity can be described as the Ôhealing of pain with pain.Õ Designating obscene rituals as Ôremedies,Õ Heraclitus, in all probability, identi es in them this same structure of the Ôunity of opposites.Õ Obscene rites, to continue the medical analogy, are designed to cure analogous actions or inclinations (whatever in HeraclitusÕ view these may have been) in the performers of those rites. To speculate on the nature of actions Heraclitus would have expected the ritual ÔremediesÕ to cure would be an overinterpretation of the analogy reported by Iamblichus.
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Having established the presence of an analogous structure in the functioning of both ritual and medical processes, it is worth examining in that respect other Heraclitean statements on ritual.
Fr. 15. eÞ m¯ DionaesÄ pomp¯n ¤poieènto kaÜ ìmneon Ÿsma aÞdoÛoisin, naid¡stata eàrgastai: É#tòw d¢ †Aidhw kaÜ Diñnusow, ÷teÄ maÛnontai kaÜ lhnaýzousin ÔIf it were not Dionysus for whom they arrange the procession and chant the hymn to the shameful parts, they would act in the most shameless way; 10 but the same are Hades and Dionysus, for whom they rave and celebrate Lenaia.Õ 8 The limits of the authentic text in HippolytusÕ quotation are dif cult to establish. For my present purposes I assume as authentic the minimal text, the authenticity of which can hardly be contested. The boundaries of the text, however, do not in uence the overall interpretation of the fragment. 9 Babut suggests that kow in HeraclitusÕ fragment has ÔneutralÕ rather than positive value, and thus the fragment must have constituted a disinterested observerÕs remark on the therapeutic function of the religious rites Further, it is reasonable to suppose that the identi cation of Dionysus and Hades in the second part of the fragment explains the contention of the rst, that the performance of phallic rituals is not Ôthe most shamelessÕ if (and only if) they are performed in honour of Dionysus. The only plausible interpretation is that by celebrating Dionysiac rituals people celebrate the identity of Dionysus and Hades, an identity of the opposites of life and death, and it is precisely the presence of the structure of the Ôunity of oppositesÕ that makes the Dionysiac rituals acceptable.
Thus the fragment of Heraclitus combines, on the one hand, a critique of the super cial understanding of the ritual, the understanding that is presumably endorsed by the oß polloÛ, with an insight into the underlying structure of the Ôunity of opposites.Õ Finally, there does not seem to be a compelling reason to see in fr. 14: tOE nomizñmena kayƒ nyrÅpouw must®ria niervstÜ mueèntai ÔInitiation into the mysteries practised among men proceeds in an unholy wayÕ 12 -an evaluative judgement, a condemnation of the mysteries, rather than a formulation of the principle that was known to, and endorsed by, the participants of the mysteries. Heraclitus is pointing to the fact that initiation (maeein) into the mysteries, in itself a ÔsacredÕ process, the process of Ôcon-secrationÕ of the candidates, 13 is achieved by performing actions that are Ôunholy.Õ The fact that the participants of the initiation rituals participated in practices that would be deemed immoral in other social contexts must have been general knowledge.
14 The rite of initiation transpires to be the unity of the ÔholyÕ initiating action and the unholy mode through which it is achieved. It is one more example of the ÔremedyÕ ( kea) that achieves its ÔholyÕ result Ôby unholy meansÕ ( niervstÛ).
Fr. 5a
15 -kayaÛrontai dƒ llÄ aámati miainñmenoi, õkoÝon eà tiw eÞw phlòn ¤mbOEw phlÒ ponÛzoito: maÛnesyai dƒ 'n dok¡oi eà tiw min nyrÅpvn ¤pifr‹-
94
MANTAS ADOME . NAS saito oìtv poi¡onta ÔThey purify themselves by polluting themselves with further blood, as if someone who stepped in mud should try to wash himself with mud. He would seem to be mad if any of men noticed him doing this,Õ 16 -is often considered to be one of the clearest and least ambiguous fragments in the Heraclitean corpus. According to Kahn, the fragment Ôis remarkable for its length and its clarity. The absence of anything enigmatic in this text might almost cast doubt on its authenticity. . . . If Heraclitus speaks here with unusual clarity and undisguised sarcasm, perhaps for once his spontaneous indignation breaks through the restraints of an indirect and allusive styleÕ (op. cit., p. 266). I shall try to show that far from being totally perspicuous, the fragment speaks, in an indirect and paradoxical manner, of the ambiguity inherent in the ritual action.
The ritual described is the Apollonian ritual of puri cation from murder -a piglet was killed over the murdererÕs head, so that the blood would drip onto his head and hands (the ritual is described in ApolloniusÕ Argonautica 4, 685-717). According to Burkert, the logic of this ritual must have been the following: Ôthe person must discover the action which has brought about the pollution and must eliminate the miasma through renewed actionÕ (Greek Religion, p. 147); Ôthe essential aspect seems to be that the person de led by blood should once again come into contact with bloodÕ (op. cit., p. 81).
Further examples adduced by Parker show that this logic was an element constantly underlined in the descriptions of the ritual. 17 ÔHeraclitus 16 The emendation of llvw (adopted by the majority of editors) into llÄ, rst proposed by FrŠnkel (H. FrŠnkel. Dichtung und Philosophie des frŸhen Griechentums. MŸnchen: Beck, 1962. P. 451) and accepted by Kranz and Walzer, will be discussed later. At present it is necessary to indicate certain grammatical features of the text that will be important to its interpretation. The word aámati, as most interpreters agree, in a characteristically Heraclitean fashion relates both to kayaÛrontai and to miainñmenoi. (The cultic reality mentioned is the puri cation from murder by blood -v. infra.) There is no need to understand the present participle miainñmenoi in the perfectual sense (= memiasm¡noi, miany¡ntew), as Marcovich does (op. cit., p. 319-320). / The translation of the last phrase by Catherine Osborne: ÔBut any human who claimed that the person was doing that would be considered insaneÕ (op. cit., p. 91) is implausible; it is more plausible to construe dok¡oi as characterising the performer of puri cation that is referred to as min, and ¤pifr‹saito is better translated as Ônoticed.Õ Another possibility is to construe dok¡oi with the second tiw: ÔAny of men who noticed him doing this would think he was madÕ (Kahn) , but since the verb dok¡oi precedes tiw ( nyrÅpvn) it would be more natural to read it as belonging to the tiw that is the subject of the second clause of the previous sentence. 17 Cf. Ôto wash away foul blood by bloodÕ (Eur. IT 1223-1224), Ôhe washed the trace of killing from my hand by slaughtering fresh blood upon itÕ (Stheneboea, prol.
MANTAS ADOME
. NAS was only emphasising a paradox of which all who thought about the rite were aware, and which seems to have been essential to its meaningÕ (Parker, op. cit., p. 372). The text of fr. 5a is quoted by Theosophia Tubingensis (full text, fr. 86a Marcovich) and by Elias of Crete (kayaÛrontai -ponÛzoito, fr. 86d Marc.). Reference to the puri cation of mud by mud is made by Gregory of Nazianzus (yusÛaw phlÒ phlòn kayairñntvn, Éw aétÇn tinow kousa l¡gontow, fr. 86e Marc.), and a loose paraphrase is given in Letter 27 by Apollonius of Tyana (fr. 86f Marc.). It is noteworthy, however, that all the authors fail to identify the archaic ritual referred to by Heraclitus, assuming the ÔbloodÕ mentioned by Heraclitus to be that of sacri ced animals. 18 The quotations by the author of Theosophia and Elias of Crete that are the basis of the reconstruction of the text of the fragment deserve closer analysis.
Although Elias of Crete (active at the end of the 11th -beginning of the 12th century)
19 is one of the latest sources for HeraclitusÕ fragments, writing a commentary on Gregory of NazianzusÕ sermon in Heronem philosophum (= or. 25) he was able to identify correctly the source of GregoryÕs allusion, 20 and quote a signi cant chunk from the beginning of fr. 5.
The 21 Previously only the most immediate context (from the words oîw diapaÛzvn tÛnew d¢ oß palaioÜ parƒ †Ellhsi yeoÜ kaÜ tÛnew oß n¡oi; palaioÜ m¢n oïn oß perÜ Krñnon, n¡oi dƒ oß pƒ ¤keÛnvn, kaÜ ¥j°w m¡xri tÇn ¤sx‹tvn ²rÅvn: µ palaioçw m¢n l¡gei toçw dÇ-deka katƒ ¤keÛnouw, n¡ouw d¢ Diñnuson "Hrakl¡a ƒAsklhpiòn kaÜ toçw loi-5 poaew, oîw d¯ p‹ntaw sugxeÝn Éw prÅhn protr¡petai õ filñsofow, 1 kaÜ tOE perÜ toaetvn aÞsxrÇw muyeuñmena, toçw llokñtouw ¦rvtaw aétÇn kaÜ toçw eÞw poikÛla eàdh metasxhmatismoçw diOE toçw aÞsxroçw kaÜ ¤mpayeÝw ¦rvtaw, kaÜ tOEw aÞsxrot¡raw yusÛaw, aåw yerapeaeein toçw aétÇn yeoçw ¤nñmizon, oîw diapaÛzvn "Hr‹kleitow, KayaÛrontai d¡, fhsÛn, aámati miainñmenoi Ësper 10 'n eà tiw eÞw phlòn ¤mbOEw phlÒ ponÛzoito. tò gOEr toÝw tÇn lñgvn zÐvn sÅmasÛ te kaÜ aámasin, " toÝw yeoÝw aétÇn pros¡feron, oàesyai kayaÛrein tOEw tÇn ÞdÛvn svm‹tvn kayarsÛaw tOEw ¤k tÇn musarÇn kaÜ kay‹rtvn mÛjevn ¤gkexrvsm¡naw aétoÝw, ÷moiñn ge <kaÜ> 2 tòn ¤k toè phloè ¤mpeplas-(fol. 90 v ) m¡non =aepon toÝw sÅmasi phlÒ peir syai por ƒ=aeptein.
1 Scil. Hero 2 kaÜ ins. Bywater
As this text shows, Elias assumes that Heraclitus speaks about the immolation of sacri cial animals for the atonement of oneÕs sins. He has some dif culties in explaining how the reduplication of ÔmudÕ is to be understood -therefore he takes ÔmudÕ to mean the impurity of the bodies polluted by sin in the rst instance, and, somewhat allegorically, Ôbod-ies and blood of irrational animalsÕ in the second instance. (It is also clear that he understands miainñmenoi in a half-participial sense: ÔThey purify themselves by de ling / as they de le themselves with bloodÕ -v. supra, n. 16.)
The author of Theosophia 22 also understands HeraclitusÕ fragment as a reference to sacri ces: †Oti "Hr‹kleitow memfñmenow toçw yaeontaw toÝw daÛmosi ¦fh: (the text of the fragment follows).
If, as FrŠnkel maintains (op. cit., p. 451), the original fragment of Heraclitus had kayaÛrontai dƒ llÄ aámati miainñmenoi, it explains the onwards), transcribed at BywaterÕs request by Ignazio Guidi, was available in Greek (I. Bywater. Heracliti Ephesii Reliquiae. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1877. P. 50). 22 Written between 474-491 AD (cf. Theosophorum Graecorum Fragmenta. Iterum recensuit H. Erbse. Stuttgart & Leipzig: Teubner, 1995. P. xiv). § § 66-68 of Theosophia containing the quotations from Heraclitus survive only in the codex Tubingensis M b 27 (= T Erbse), copied in the 16th century from the early (and imprecise) epitome contained in the codex Argentoratensis that perished in a re in 1870 (see Erbse, op. cit., p. ix-xi, xvii). It may be relevant to the history of the transmission of the text of HeraclitusÕ fr. 5 that in §66 (immediately before the quotations from Heraclitus) there is a reference to Iamblichus (the only one in Theosophia) that does not serve any obvious purpose in terms of the argument of Theosophia: †Oti ƒI‹mblixow õ Xalkideçw PorfurÛou mayht®w (the previous §65 reports theological opinions of Porphyrius). Although the data are too scanty to propose any hypothesis, it would seem that the way HeraclitusÕ fr. 5 reached Theosophia was somehow related to Iamblichus. . 23 In support of that assumption stands the fact that the manuscript T of Theosophia is far from reliable (in the text of fr. 5, there are the following obvious mistakes: min Snell: uton T aétòn Buresch, Diels; tout¡oisin] toè t¡oisi T; eëxontai] ¦xontai T; oë ti Diels (ex Origene): yaeein T). On the other hand, if we assume that the original text had llvw, it is almost impossible to explain the omission of it by Elias, since it is most likely that in the context of emphasis on the ÔderisionÕ of pagan rituals (cf. diapaÛzvn "Hr‹kleitow . . . fhsÛ) he would have retained the word which implies a condescending, derisive attitude.
Thus the beginning of the fragment introduces a paradoxical statement -ÔThey purify themselves by polluting themselves with further bloodÕ -that reveals the structure of the Ôunity of oppositesÕ: puri cation and de lement are, from the habitual point of view, contrary activities. Nevertheless, both pollution and puri cation are performed by blood, and thus blood exhibits contrary properties in that it is both polluting and purifying. It is useful to recall, in this connection, fr. 61: ÔThe sea is the purest (kayarÅtaton) and the most polluted (miarÅtaton) water: for sh drinkable and life-sustaining; for men undrinkable and deadlyÕ. Speaking of sea water, Heraclitus operates with the notions of ÔpurityÕ and Ôde lementÕ that in fr. 5a are applied to the contrary states, transition between which is achieved by blood: transition from purity to de lement in murder, and from de lement to purity in the rite de passage of puri cation. ÔBloodÕ in fr. 5a is a substance that exhibits the structure of the Ôunity of opposites.Õ In it and through it, purifying and de ling actions are united in a way that is very similar to the Ôunity of oppositesÕ in Ôsea waterÕ in fr. 61.
Also, the function of ÔbloodÕ in fr. 5a resembles very much the functioning of kea ÔremediesÕ (see fr. 68) to which the operation of mystery rites is likened. It Ôpuri es blood with further bloodÕ in a way that is in principle identical with the healing of pain by in icting further pain. In both cases it is easy to discern the structure of the Ôunity of oppositesÕ that, in HeraclitusÕ view, constitutes the essence of such practices.
The part of the fragment that follows -õkoÝon eà tiw eÞw phlòn ¤mbOEw phlÒ ponÛzoito: maÛnesyai dƒ 'n dok¡oi eà tiw min nyrÅpvn ¤pifr‹saito oìtv poi¡onta -draws a parallel to the puri cation by blood, likening it to the Ôwashing of mud by mud.Õ 24 Although most of the commentators regard it as a remark on the absurdity of the practices of puri cation by blood, there is a slight anomaly of phrasing that helps us to decipher the intended meaning. The phrase eà tiw nyrÅpvn has been regarded as redundant in Greek where it would have suf ced to say eà tiw. Wilamowitz even suggested deleting nyrÅpvn as a dittography (op. cit., S. 206 n. 2). Marcovich (op. cit., p. 320), on the other hand, tries to explain the redundancy away, stating that the meanings of the two expressions are identical, and for support adducing two examples from the Odyssey that are supposed to have identical meaning (cf. mhd¡ tinƒ nyrÅpvn protiñsseo mhdƒ ¤r¡eine at VII 31, and mhd¡ tina protiñsseo mhdƒ ¤r¡eine at XXIII 365). It is precisely these examples that help us to see the difference between the two expressions. At VII 31 it is the goddess Athena that in disguise speaks to Odysseus, therefore it is quite understandable that she advises him not to engage in talk with any among men. In the second case, Odysseus speaks to his wife, therefore it also makes perfect sense that there is no quali cation similar to that in AthenaÕs remark.
By saying that Ôsuch a man would seem to be raving, if any among men should notice him doing it,Õ Heraclitus postulates the difference between the perspective of ÔmenÕ and that of Ôgods,Õ 25 drawing attention to the different meaning the same action acquires in profane and in ritual contexts. 26 The ritual practice, characterised by the structure of the Ôunity of opposites,Õ from a secular perspective has as much (or rather, little) sense as the washing of mud with mud -in the religious context, however, it is the structure of the unity of opposites that prevails and makes sense.
27 25 One could point, in this context, to fr. 78: ·yow nyrÅpeion oék ¦xei gnÅmaw, yeÝon d¢ ¦xei, and to fr. 102 (although authenticity of the latter is not without question): tÒ m¢n yeÒ kalOE p‹nta kaÜ gayOE kaÜ dÛkaia, nyrvpoi d¢ " m¢n dika êpeil®fasin " d¢ dÛkaia. On the other hand, the plural nyrvpoi in the fr. 5 may share in the epistemologically pejorative connotations of ÔmultitudeÕ implicit in HeraclitusÕ use of oß polloÛ and d°mow (frr. 2, 17, 29, 57, 104, and cf. fr. 1).
26 Ita Osborne, op. cit., p. 91. Also, for an attempt to interpret this fragment along these lines, see: H1 erakleitas. Fragmentai. [Ed., with a transl., introd. and comm., by] M. Adom1 enas. Vilnius: Aidai, 1995. P. 254, 259-260. The attempt, however, to read a positive sense into the text of the fragment retaining llvw Ôin vain; differentlyÕ does not seem convincing. 27 Edward Hussey has drawn my attention to the connection between this interpretation of fr. 5a and the Ôanimal fragmentsÕ 13 & 37. In both fragments a substance that is conventionally thought to be ÔuncleanÕ or ÔpollutingÕ by men (mud, dust and ashes) is represented as ÔcleanÕ or ÔpurifyingÕ for certain animals (pigs and chickens). In addition to the traditional reading that sees in these fragments a paradox (or contradiction) in terms of value-choice, one may wonder whether it was not HeraclitusÕ intention to trace the presence of the identical rationale, or lñgow, not only in the human, but also in the animal world, scilicet in the whole realm of living beings. For, if one re ects solely upon the performative aspect of the animal practices without any overtones of evaluative preconceptions (as Heraclitus seems to have done in the case of the human religious practices), it is evident that animals do actually wash themselves with mud and dust quite in the same sense as the sea-water, Ômost impureÕ as it is for humans, is actually Ômost pureÕ for the sh in the fr. 61. On this reading, the structure of the Ôunity of oppositesÕ reveals itself not only in the fact that the same substance exhibits contrary properties vis-ˆ-vis different percipients, but also by the coincidence in it of the contrary functions. On the other hand, although the practice itself (viewed from a purely formal, performative aspect) may be validated by the presence of the structure of Ôunity of opposites,Õ the blind performance by the uncomprehending, Ôabsent while presentÕ (fr. 34), has no merit in it (cf. frr. 5b, 15, and the complex of frr. 1, 89, 73, 34, as well as, under a slightly different aspect, fr. 107), and thus one might conjecture that just as gods recognise the validity of human rituals (v. supra ad fr. 5a), humans recognise the logos of animal practices (humans stand in relation to animals as gods stand to humans in frr. 82 & 83).
(One should notice that in this fragment, as well as in fr. 15, Heraclitus repeatedly characterises the actions of the participants of the ritual as manÛa, thus drawing attention to the ambiguity inherent in the phenomenon. What appears to be ÔmadnessÕ from the secular perspective, acquires meaning as the embodiment, in the sphere of ritual, of the structure of the Ôunity of opposites;Õ and although those that take part in the Dionysiac processions are said to ÔraveÕ (maÛnesyai), it is not, after all, Ômost shamelessÕ action, which it would be, were it not performed in honour of Dionysus. I shall return to discussion of the signi cance of manÛa in connection with fragments 92 & 93.) So, the main conceptual scheme of HeraclitusÕ philosophy -the unity of opposites -is shown not only to be present in the rituals, but, in fact, to constitute the essential structure of the ritual action.
Fr. 5b -kaÜ toÝw g‹lmasi d¢ tout¡oisin eëxontai, õkoÝon eà tiw toÝw dñmoisi lesxhneaeoito, oë ti ginÅskvn yeoçw oédƒ ´rvaw oátin¡w eÞsi -closely resembles the critique of popular religion and the attack on the veneration of images. However, the qualifying clause at the end of the fragmentÔnot knowing what gods and heroes areÕ -renders it unlikely that what is intended is unconditional censure.
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The conventional translation runs as following: ÔAnd they pray to these images as if someone was chatting with houses, not knowing what gods and heroes are.Õ The very metaphor Heraclitus uses, likening images of gods to ÔhousesÕ (dñmoi), testi es that what he has in mind is slightly different from the classic criticisms of idolatry (one such example would be the interpretation of Clement, who says that in this fragment Heraclitus Ôreproaches statues for their insensitivityÕ (t¯n naisyhsÛan ôneidÛzontow toÝw g‹lmasi, protrept. 50, 4)). Instead of likening the statues of gods to lifeless stones or pieces of wood (as was the habit of the Christian writers that drew on Isaiah 44, 9-20), Heraclitus speaks of ÔhousesÕ -he seems to imply a distinction between the ÔhouseÕ and the ÔinhabitantÕ that is in a certain way related to, but not identical with, the Ôhouse.Õ The fault of MANTAS ADOME . NAS hoi polloi, then, seems to consist in the failure to distinguish gods that are in some -as yet unspeci ed -way related to, and accessible through, their images, from the images themselves. The ultimate qualifying clause con rms the suggestion that the object of HeraclitusÕ critique is some failure to recognise what gods and heroes are. Since, however, the fragment, apart from this negative observation, does not specify their nature (and there is no reason to suppose it ever did), the present reading seems to end in a certain hermeneutic impasse. Thus the hypothetical reader is referred back to the metaphorical comparison that occupies the central position in the fragment -õkoÝon eà tiw toÝw dñmoisi lesxhneaeoito -for the explanation as to Ôwhat gods and heroes are.Õ Can this analogy shed any further light as to why prayers to statues are a sign of ignorance? I suggest that it is at this stage, on a deeper scrutiny, that an alternative meaning of the phrase õkoÝon eà tiw toÝw dñmoisi lesxhneaeoito is activated: it can also be plausibly translated Ôas if someone was having a conversation at home.Õ 29 After all, toÝw dñmoisi can quite naturally be read in a locative sense.
How plausible is this scenario of reading? The validity of the rst way of reading is con rmed by the fact that it is adopted by the ancient authorities that are our sources of the fragment -by Celsus, Origenes, and, in all likelihood, by the common source of the Theosophia and the Acta Apollonii (cf. frr. 86 b, c, g 1 , g 2 Marc.). The syntactical parallelism of the dative constructions -toÝw g‹lmasi . . . tout¡oisin eëxontai in the rst part, and toÝw dñmoisi lesxhneaeoito in the central phrase of the fragmentseems to impose a parallelism of meaning that stems from a certain momentum of understanding as one reads the fragment for the rst time: just as one prays to the statues, so the conversation is made to, or with, the houses. (The syntactical parallelism is strengthened by the alliterative links between the two phrases: toÝw g‹lmasi d¢ tout¡oisin eëxontai, õkoÝon eâ tiw toÝw dñmoisi lesxhneaeoito.) On the other hand, as the rst reading yields no positive sense apart from the very fact of the condemnation of prayers to statues, the last phrase redirects the hypothetical reader back, to a re-reading of the central phrase, and, syntactical parallelism apart, the locative reading of dñmoisi is otherwise more Ônatural,Õ and reasserts itself on the second reading. Thus the fragment seems to be deliberately constructed in such a way so as to call forth two alternative readings. Fur-thermore, there are no methodological reasons to maintain that any one reading ought to be privileged over another, and it is quite in keeping with HeraclitusÕ practice elsewhere that both of them would be intendedHeraclitus, after all, is notorious for intentional ambiguities ( or Ôchatter,Õ we may note that these are -both phenomenologically and by de nitionprimarily ÔpublicÕ phenomena.) It would seem -although the scarcity of occurrences makes the veri cation of this view impossible -that the very practising of lesxhneaeesyai Ôat homeÕ would involve certain contradiction, and that there is certain inappropriateness in the semantic combination of the two words. Is this the same inappropriateness that makes the prayers to the statues inappropriate, as well? In order to answer this question, we should rst have to translate the implications of HeraclitusÕ metaphor.
Even if in the given context lesxhneaeomai does not bear the connotations of the ÔpublicÕ conversation, the most immediate semantic opposition that springs to mind in this connection is that between what is Ôat homeÕ and what is Ôpublic,Õ between the ÔprivacyÕ of home and the Ôcom-munal spaceÕ of the polis. (It is the same semantic opposition that resurfaces in the ÞdÛ& / dhmosÛ& distinction of the later writers.) ÔAt homeÕ seems to imply a certain seclusion from what is Ôpublic.Õ The only thing that can be wrong with conversation Ôat homeÕ is that it does not attain to the universality of the polis, that it substitutes ÔdomesticÕ concerns for the ÔcommonÕ ones (see the emphasis on the need to rely on nñmow, the expression of the ÕuniversalÕ (junñn) in the domain of the political, in frr. 44 & 114).
Therefore we may tentatively surmise that the opposition Ôpublic vs. at homeÕ that is implied in HeraclitusÕ comparison yields itself to translation MANTAS ADOME . NAS in terms of the opposition junñn (koinñn) vs. between the universality of the philosophical truth as opposed to ÔprivacyÕ of separatedness from the universal logos, then the parallel drawn between the prayers to statues, and between a conversation (that is usually held in public) carried out at home is merely yet another condemnation of the practice. On this understanding, the fragmentÕs meaning can be paraphrased as: ÔAnd they pray to the statues, lost in their delusions and thinking they are in the possession of the truth, though they do not know what gods and heroes areÕ. Then it does not contain an answer to the question implied by the concluding phrase of the fragment -the question as to Ôwhat gods and heroes areÕ. One is, however, tempted to extend the meaning of the opposition xunon / idion in fr. 5b. There are two reasons for it, neither of which is a suf cient in itself, but combined they provide a certain justi cation for doing so. First, the central place occupied in the fragmentÕs composition suggests that the phrase õkoÝon eà tiw toÝw dñmoisi lesxhneaeoito ought to provide a clue both as to why the prayer to the statues is absurd, and as to what gods and heroes are. Second, in the context of the xunon / idion opposition the reported saying of Heraclitus springs to mind, in which gods are characterised by ÔuniversalityÕ in the sense of omnipresence: eänai kaÜ ¤ntaèya yeoaew (De part. an. A 5, 645a21 = A 9 DK).
(A detour may be due here in order to answer the question: What was Heraclitus doing when he uttered these words? According to the existing editions of the De partibus animalium and the prevailing interpretation of the passage (645a17-21), as the visitors entered, he was Ôwarming himself by the replaceÕ (eädon aétòn yerñmenon pròw ÞpnÒ). One of the subtler exegeses of the anecdote in its present form was proposed by Louis Robert:
31 the visitors, having entered the house and stopped by the hearth, ¥stÛa, saw Heraclitus warming himself by the kitchen re, Þpnñw, admittedly the more vulgar and utilitarian re of the two, as well as devoid of the religious connotations characteristic to ¥stÛa. Hence their surprise at the occupation that seemed to be unworthy of a philosopher, and the ensuing remark by Heraclitus. However, Aristotle adduces the story as an encouragement to overcome disgust that follows upon the study of the baser animals (cf. diò deÝ m¯ dusxeraÛnein paidikÇw t¯n perÜ tÇn timot¡rvn zÐvn ¤pÛskecin (15-16); poll°w dusxereÛaw (28); [zÐoiw] m¯ kexarism¡noiw pròw t¯n aàsyhsin (7-8); prosi¡nai deÝ m¯ dusvpoaemenon (22)), and, as Robertson observed, the tale in question, Ôif taken literally, is singularly at as an illustration of the necessity of overcoming instinctive disgust in the search for beauty and truthÕ. 32 Nor does this reading explain the logic of the story -why the visitors had to be Ôordered to enter bravelyÕ (¤k¡leue gOEr aétoçw eÞsi¡nai yarroèntaw). Robertson, referring to the usage of Þpnñw Ô replace; room where the replace is, i.e. kitchenÕ as a euphemism for koprÅn Ôlavatory,Õ attested in Aristophanes (see Pollux, v 91; Hesychius, s.v. Þpnñw), suggests that y¡resyai pròw ÞpnÒ was a euphemism for Ôto be in the lavatoryÕ (ibid.; the rise of the euphemism may have been occasioned by the fact that in some Greek houses the kitchen used to be next to the lavatory; cf. also the glosses equating culina with latrina in TLL s.v. culina). This interpretation, though endorsed by Martin West, 33 does not explain suf ciently the presence of yerñmenon. Besides, it is more plausible to suppose a euphemistic substitution of ÔlavatoryÕ with ÔkitchenÕ (very much in the way that ÔlavatoryÕ or ÔbathroomÕ is itself a euphemistic substitution), than the existence of the Ôcomplex,Õ or phraseological, euphemism -y¡resyai pròw ÞpnÒ -for the whole activity in question. In my view, the suggestion by Mouraviev gives a satisfactory solution to the problem. He proposes that yerñmenon is a corruption of yrÅmenon (from 31 See L. Robert. ÔH raclite ˆ son fourneau. Un mot dÕH raclite dans Aristote (Parties des animaux, 645a) the rare word yr‹omai Ôto sitÕ, cf. Philetas, fr. 14 ap. Athen. V, 192 e), 34 or, better still, of its Ionic form yreñmenon.) 35 To return to HeraclitusÕ discussion of the religious images, could the reason for the condemnation of the prayers to statues be that those who pray to statues address gods that are omnipresent, xunoi, in a Ôparticular,Õ in this-or-that statue, deeming it to be more privileged with access to the deity over other places or things, not realising that what they address in their prayers is but what an empty house is to someone who is looking for its inhabitant? In such case they would indeed be like someone who tried to have a public conversation in the seclusion of their home.
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In this fragment we get closest to what could be termed a critique of the religious practices. Yet failure to recognise, and seclusion from, the universal logos that is always at hand is a common predicament of the ignorant multitude (cf. frr. 1, 72, 17, 2 et al.). Thus it would seem that the fragment condemns the ignorance of the multitude rather than the religious practice itself. If our reading of the fragment is correct, then the prayer speci cally to the statue is futile -for gods are everywhere -but is it really to be condemned? For gods are there also. Finally, someone who knows Ôwhat gods and heroes areÕ will realise the paradoxical coincidence of the ÔuniversalÕ and the ÔparticularÕ that appears in the practice of praying to statues (when a Ôuniversal,Õ ubiquitous god is Ôrepre-sented,Õ for cultic purposes, by this or that statue), and which echoes the structure of the unity of opposites that frames human existence in general: trapped in the limitations of the mortal condition, reaching out towards the universal and everlasting truth of the Logos. The general tenor of the fragment seems to be analogous to that of fr. 15: if the only meaning of the practice was that which the multitude gives to it, it would really be naid¡stata, but the practice is justi able insofar as in it there is a deeper meaning that can be described in terms of HeraclitusÕ own philosophy.
Fr. 96 -n¡kuew koprÛvn ¤kblhtñteroi -has earned the title of Ôa studied insult to ordinary Greek sentimentÕ from Dodds, 37 and many an interpreter has wondered why the dead body should excite such a erce censure by Heraclitus. To think along these lines, however, means to overlook the possibility that the three words of the fragment may not, after all, be intended as an insult, but as a statement of fact which assumes rather than subverts the existing practices of the Greek funerary rituals. On the phenomenal level, towards the end of the prothesis in the Mediterranean climate it must become more and more self-evident that, because of the incipient putrefaction, corpses are, indeed, Ômore to be thrown away than dung.Õ The logical emphasis of the fragment may have been placed on the contradiction between this state of affairs and traditional funeral practices. The surviving words may have constituted a rst part of the fragment that would have run something like the following: ÔCorpses are more to be thrown away than dung, and yet they are afforded various ritual honours / almost god-like veneration / sumptuous funerals vel sim.Õ On this reading, one does not have to conjecture about Ôthe absence of the ery elementÕ or other considerations that could have aroused HeraclitusÕ animosity against n¡kuew (although it does not preclude the possibility of such an interpretation). And if the proposed reading is correct, then we have one more instance of HeraclitusÕ reference to a widespread practice that conforms to the structure of Ôunity of oppositesÕ -viz., a very humble object is treated with almost religious honours. Besides, Heraclitus may be exploiting the ambiguity that was inherent in the Greek attitude to the dead body -in spite of all the funerary honours and veneration, the touching of the corpse causes pollution (see Parker, op. cit., Ch. 2: ÔBirth and Death,Õ esp. p. 32-48).
Although, due to the lack of evidence, this reconstruction must remain conjectural, it is not an entirely speculative conjecture. We have an explicit reference to the honours accorded to the dead in fr. 24: rhóf‹touw yeoÜ timÇsi kaÜ nyrvpoi. Furthermore, EpicharmusÕ (?) fr. 64 DK, apparently reminiscent of HeraclitusÕ fr. 96, stresses both Ôdung-likeÕ and Ôgod-likeÕ aspect of the dead body: eÞmÜ nekrñw: nekròw d¢ kñprow, g° dƒ ² kñprow ¤stÛn: / eÞ dƒ g° yeñw ¤stƒ, oé nekrñw, llOE yeñw (it seems likely that the MANTAS ADOME . NAS
ÔearthÕ that functions as a medium of identi cation of dung with god is a later Epicharmean (?) addition in order to reduce HeraclitusÕ paradox into a comic absurdity). And nally, after the radical devaluation of body as such that has become a locus communis since Plato, it would not be surprising if the same sentiment was read into HeraclitusÕ fragment, simultaneously failing to notice its paradoxical content, and only its memorable opening was transmitted through quotations.
It remains to discuss two fragments dealing with another aspect of popular religion -the practice of oracles and prophecy. Fr. 93 speaks of ApolloÕs oracle at Delphi: õ naj oð tò manteÝñn ¤sti tò ¤n DelfoÝw oëte l¡gei oëte kraeptei llOE shmaÛnei ÔThe lord whose oracle is in Delphi neither declares nor conceals, but gives a sign.Õ Fr. 92 is the rst extant mention of the Sibyl: SÛbulla mainom¡nÄ stñmati g¡lasta [kaÜ kallÅpista kaÜ maerista] fyeggom¡nh xilÛvn ¤tÇn ¤jikneÝtai t» fvn» diOE tòn yeñn ÔThe Sibyl with raving mouth utters things mirthless [and unadorned and unperfumed] , and her voice carries through a thousand years because of the god (scil. that speaks through her).Õ
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Since Antiquity it has been assumed that in fr. 93 Heraclitus, describing the practice of the Delphic oracle, formulates a hermeneutic principle that is to be applied in order to understand his own oblique mode of communication which is, in its turn, grounded in the very structure of reality (fragments 56, 123, 54, as well as 107 seem to testify in favour of this view). ÔThe giving of a sign,Õ a mode of communication proper to Apollo, that is said to be Ôneither declaring nor concealing,Õ is, of course, simultaneously both declaring and concealing. Speech that conceals its real meaning, and incomprehensible paradox that reveals its meaning to those who know how to read it, seem to be essential features of the Pythian communication. 39 Again one can see the contour of the ubiquitous Ôunity of oppositesÕ lurking in the background.
If the gist of the paraphrase by Plutarch is correct (and there is no com- pelling reason to disbelieve him, in view of the consensus of other ancient authors quoting or alluding to this fragment (see fr. 75 a 1 , b 1 , c Marc.)), in fr. 92 Heraclitus is contrasting the exterior aspect of Sibylline prophecies with the god-given truth they carry. Viewed from an Ôeveryday perspectiveÕ the Sibyl appears to speak Ôwith a raving mouth,Õ that is to say, in a crazy and absurd way -nonetheless, this is the way that the prophecies coming from Apollo are communicated. Meaningless ÔravingÕ of the seemingly mad woman is at the same time a highly meaningful activity in terms of its religious context. In the SibylÕs discourse, the meaninglessness (that appears looking from an Ôeveryday,Õ ÔsecularÕ perspective) combines with a deep, supra-human prophetic meaning.
In fr. 92 Heraclitus employs manÛa, ÔmadnessÕ or Ôraving,Õ in a way that in general terms resembles the usage of this concept in fr. 5 and, most probably, fr. 15: for Heraclitus manÛa represents the absurdity and paradoxicality of religious practices, apparent when they are viewed from a secular perspective. This absurdity, however, appears to be grounded in the fundamental impossibility of ÔtranslatingÕ supra-human reality into human everyday language (cf. in that connection fr. 78, 79, 70, 102 et al.) . (This impossibility must be akin to the Ôhermeneutic gapÕ announced in the very rst sentence of Heraclitus saeggramma: toè d¢ lñgou toèdƒ ¤ñntow aÞeÜ jaenetoi gÛnontai nyrvpoi.) Therefore the prophecies of the Sibyl have to be uttered Ôwith raving mouth,Õ and the lord of Delphi cannot communicate the divine truth other than by Ôgiving a sign.Õ
Conclusions
Instead of ÔEnlightenment radicalismÕ we encounter in HeraclitusÕ thought the beginnings of the philosophy of religion. Heraclitus tries to give an interpretation of traditional religious practices in terms of his own philosophy, identifying in those practices a structure of the Ôunity of oppositesÕ that plays a prominent role in his account of reality. Far from being reductionist, Heraclitus treats religious practices in a way similar to his treatment of ethics and politics, which he also tries to incorporate into his highly integrated vision of reality, whereby a universal principle (identical with the content of the logos that Heraclitus announces) governs both the cosmos and human society.
Although there seems to be an element of criticism in respect of the religion of the vulgus, Heraclitus seems to resist not the religious practices themselves, but, very much in keeping with his antipopulist ethics (cf. . However, the traditional accounts, as well as ordinary human understanding, are criticised inasmuch as they fall short of realising the logos, the rationale or the formal structure which is both inherent in human practices and simultaneously transcends them (see fr. 108: õkñsvn lñgouw kousa, oédeÜw fikneÝtai ¤w toèto Ëste ginÅskein ÷ti sofñn ¤sti p‹ntvn kexvrism¡non, and the beginning of fr. 1). The interpretation of HeraclitusÕ attitude to religious practice offered in the present text differs from that of Catherine Osborne in that I do not think that Heraclitus postulates two rationales -a secular and a religious one -for human practices (cf. Osborne, op. cit., p. 93). According to her, religious practice acquires sense only when interpreted within religious context, whereas most people mistakenly interpret religious practices within a secular context (ibid., p. 92-93). In my view, Heraclitus attempts to identify a single rationale -the inherent structure of the Ôunity of oppositesÕ -that lies behind religious, as well as secular, practices and which the majority of people do not recognise, just as they do not understand the logos (fr. 1).
40 40 There are certain more general objections to the way HeraclitusÕ thought is interpreted in the aforementioned text by Catherine Osborne. To describe the central categories of HeraclitusÕ philosophy she adopts the conceptual structure of Ôcontext-dependence of signi canceÕ as the most adequate means of description. In itself, it is merely a mildly more anachronistic description of the pattern in HeraclitusÕ reasoning that is usually described as the Ôrelational constitution of properties.Õ It is employed by Heraclitus in several fragments (e.g., frr. 60, 61, 9, 13, 37, 4, 58, 79). However, identifying it as central to HeraclitusÕ thinking, Catherine Osborne misinterprets, in my view, the starting point and the goal of HeraclitusÕ speculative project. This It is the presence (and recognition) of the structure of Ôunity-in-oppositesÕ that validates religious practices. One must be aware, however, that for Heraclitus the ultimate principle of reality transcends deities involved in the ritual and cult of the traditional religion (in fr. 53, ÔWar,Õ Pñlemow is said to be a ÔfatherÕ of both Ômen and gods;Õ the Ôone wiseÕ Ôdoes not want and want to be called by the name of ZeusÕ (fr. 32)). ÔMortals and immortalsÕ (fr. 62), ÔmenÕ and ÔgodsÕ become pairs of opposites in the context of overall unifying structure that lies beyond the division into ÔhumanÕ and Ôdivine.Õ In formulating it, Heraclitus employs images and formulae taken over from traditional religion (the traditional formulaic appellation of Zeus (cf. Il. I 544, Soph. Tr. 275, Hes. Theog. 886, Pind. O. VII 34) is employed to introduce the Heraclitean principle, ÔWar,Õ in fr. 53). The structure of Ôunity of oppositesÕ functions as a formal structure of the ultimate principle of reality that is identi ed with the cosmic god (ÔThe god: day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, satiety and hunger. It alters as < re>, when mingled with perfumes it is named according to the scent of each oneÕ (fr. 67)). Is there, however, any continuity (or transition) between ritual practices and that ultimate reality apart from the identity of the formal structure?
The evidence is too scanty for any certainty on this question. On the other hand, if we attempt to articulate the existing data under the relevant aspect, the picture that emerges would seem to indicate the presence of hierarchically ordered structure of Ôunity-of-opposites,Õ whereby a ÔunityÕ of the lower order becomes one of the ÔoppositesÕ in the higher-order structure. The extant mentions of individual gods indicate that for Heraclitus each of them represented a certain unity of opposites. In fr. 15 Dionysus, who is said to be identical with Hades, clearly expresses the unity of identi cation implies that the ÔunityÕ of reality is epistemologically prior, and that Heraclitus merely points out how this pre-assumed unity differentiates itself in various contexts. Whereas on my view, Heraclitus starts from fragmented empirical ÔgivensÕ and, identifying in them the prevailing structure of the Ôunity in opposites,Õ arrives at a uni ed account of reality (cf. fr. 110: oék ¤moè llOE toè lñgou koaesantaw õmologeÝn sofñn ¤stin ©n p‹nta eänai). (The Ôcontext-dependence of signi cance,Õ or the Ôrelational constitution of propertiesÕ is, for Heraclitus, one of the instances of the functioning of the structure of the Ôunity of opposites.Õ) Unity results from application of the structure of the Ôunity of oppositesÕ as a universal ÔlawÕ that uni es reality by providing it with a formal structure of division into opposites. The ÔGodÕ in fr. 67, then, is not to be interpreted in the sense: ÔThere may be one god, but we give the one god a name according to the context we encounter it inÕ (Osborne, op. cit., p. 96), but ought to be understood, if one may draw such an analogy, as a Kantian Ôregula-tive ideaÕ of the ultimate unity of both reality and experience.
life and death, and Apollo is a gure of the unity of truth (or prophetic insight) and madness (fr. 92), as well as of revelation and concealment (fr. 93). If we move to the higher order, the ÔgodsÕ of the traditional worldview emerge as one of the elements of a more comprehensive opposition between ÔgodsÕ and ÔhumansÕ (frr. 53, 62; cf. frr. 30, 24). The opposition between ÔgodsÕ and ÕhumansÕ reaches its unity in the Pñlemow, one of HeraclitusÕ names for the ultimate reality that is described through employment of the traditional religious language (v. supra), and is apparently identi ed with the cosmic Ôgod.Õ This ultimate unity of opposites uni es the most fundamental categories of existence (fr. 53) and of experience (fr. 67). 41 Furthermore, if we accept the view that fr. 10 states the general principle of HeraclitusÕ theoretical procedure, and that the rst pair of termssull‹ciew: ÷la kaÜ oéx ÷la -could be interpreted as an attempt to describe the dialectical movement of thinking, whereby each newly comprehended Ôunity-of-oppositesÕ constitutes simultaneously a ÔwholeÕ (in the sense that it is internally complete structure) and Ônon-wholeÕ (in the sense that it can be assumed into further synthesis, the previous ÔunityÕ thus becoming an element of a larger structure of the Ôunity of oppositesÕ, and the process is incomplete until the total synthesis is reached), 42 then the previously outlined hierarchic structuring of HeraclitusÕ treatment of gods and rituals exempli es a pattern of precisely such a dialectical movement. On this view, it would seem more likely that Heraclitus presumes not only an analogy of formal structure, but also a theoretically envisaged continuity between cultic practices and the ultimate reality of his philosophical theology.
Once that is said, the difference between HeraclitusÕ and XenophanesÕ projects becomes more apparent. Xenophanes rejects false anthropomorphic theology, current in contemporary religious practices, in an attempt to construct a non-anthropomorphic one. Although there is no evidence in the extant fragments, it is fairly obvious that the construction of such a theology would have required a reform of worship, since religious prac-tices are continuous with the underlying theology. Heraclitus, on the contrary, is not a reformer or an AufklŠrer, but an interpreter, who tries to discern the pattern inherent in the existing practices, and exploit it in the construction of his own philosophical theology.
Heraclitus nds in the traditional religious practices the expression of the logos, of the ontological and epistemological structure of reality. In particular, they re ect the structure of human existence -its fundamental limitations and the separation of the ignorant majority from the universal truth of logos, on the one hand, and, on the other, the possibility of selfdisclosure of this truth to a philosopher who knows how to decipher the hints that the human condition contains. Therefore religious practices, as well as other human practices and institutions -such as city and family, or language -are faithful articulations of the principle that fashions both human existence and the whole of the reality. The main vehicle of XenophanesÕ critique of traditional religion, the distinction between Ôman-madeÕ religion and the ÔtrueÕ state of things (a distinction that will later resurface in the nñmow / faesiw antinomy) is overcome.*
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